

EXHIBIT NO. 16

Secret
Serial 0130012

WAR AND NAVY DEPARTMENT,
Washington, November 5, 1941.

Memorandum for the President:

Subject: Estimate Concerning Far Eastern Situation.

The Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff have reexamined the military situation in the Far East, particularly in the light of messages recently received from the American Ambassador to Chungking, the Magruder Mission, and the United States Naval Attache. These despatches have indicated it to be Chiang Kai-Shek's belief that a Japanese attack on Kunming is imminent, and that military support from outside sources, particularly by the use of United States and British air units, is the sole hope for defeat of this threat. The Secretary of State has requested advice as to the attitude which this Government should take toward a Japanese offensive against Kunming and the Burma Road.

There is little doubt that a successful Japanese offensive against the Burma Road would be a very severe blow to the Chinese Central Government. The result might even be the collapse of further effective military resistance by that Government, and thus the liquidation by Japan of the "China incident". If use of the Burma Road is lost, United States and British Commonwealth aid to China will be seriously curtailed for some months. If resistance by the Chinese Central Government ceases, the need for Japanese troops in China will be reduced. These troops can then be employed elsewhere, after the lapse of time sufficient to permit their withdrawal.

Concentration of Japanese troops for the contemplated offensive, based in northern Indo-China, cannot be completed in less than about two months, although initial offensive operations might be undertaken before that time. The advance toward Kunming over nearly three hundred miles of rough country, with poor communications, will be extremely difficult. The maintenance of supply lines will not be easy. The Chinese, on favorable defense terrain, would have a good chance of defeating this offensive by the use of ground troops alone, provided those troops are adequate in quality and numbers.

The question that the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff have taken under consideration is whether or not the United States is justified in undertaking offensive military operations with U. S. forces against Japan, to prevent her from severing the Burma Road. They consider that such operations, however well-disguised, would lead to war.

At the present time the United States Fleet in the Pacific is inferior to the Japanese Fleet and cannot undertake an unlimited strategic offensive in the Western Pacific. In order to be able to do so, it would have to be strengthened by withdrawing all¹ naval vessels from the Atlantic except those assigned to local defense forces. An unlimited offensive by the Pacific Fleet would require tremendous merchant tonnage, which could only be withdrawn from services now considered essential. The result of withdrawals from the Atlantic of naval and merchant strength might well cause the United Kingdom to lose the Battle of the Atlantic in the near future.

The only existing² plans for war against Japan in the Far East are to conduct defensive war, in cooperation with the British and Dutch, for the defense of the Philippines and the British and Dutch East Indies. The Philippines are now being reinforced. The present combined naval, air, and ground forces will make attack on the islands a hazardous undertaking. By about the middle of December, 1941, United States air and submarine strength in the Philippines will have become a positive threat to any Japanese operations south of Formosa. The U. S. Army air forces in the Philippines will have reached the projected strength by February or March, 1942. The potency of this threat will have then increased to a point where it might well be a deciding factor in deterring Japan in operations in the areas south and west of the Philippines. By this time, additional British naval and air reinforcements to Singapore will have arrived. The general defensive strength of the entire southern area against possible Japanese operations will then have reached impressive proportions.

Until such time as the Burma Road is closed, aid can be extended to Chiang-Kai-Shek by measures which probably will not result in war with Japan. These measures are: continuation of economic pressure against Japan, supplying increas-

¹ Preceded by handwritten insertion "practically".

² Two preceding words struck out, and handwritten word "current" substituted.

ing amounts of munitions under the Lend-Lease, and continuation and acceleration of aid to the American Volunteer Group.

The Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff are in accord in the following conclusions:

(a) The basic military policies and strategy agreed to in the United States-British Staff conversations remain sound. The primary objective of the two nations is the defeat of Germany. If Japan be defeated and Germany remain undefeated, decision will still have not been reached. In any case, an unlimited offensive war should not be undertaken against Japan, since such a war would greatly weaken the combined effort in the Atlantic against Germany, the most dangerous enemy.

(b) War between the United States and Japan should be avoided while building up defensive forces in the Far East, until such time as Japan attacks or directly threatens territories whose security to the United States is of very great importance. Military action against Japan should be undertaken only in one or more of the following contingencies:

(1) A direct act of war by Japanese armed forces against the territory or mandated territory of the United States, the British Commonwealth, or the Netherlands East Indies;

(2) The movement of Japanese forces into Thailand to the west of 100° East or South of 10° North; or into Portuguese Timor, New Caledonia, or the Loyalty Islands.

(c) If war with Japan can not be avoided, it should follow the strategic lines of existing war plans; i. e., military operations should be primarily defensive, with the object of holding territory, and weakening Japan's economic position.

(d) Considering world strategy, a Japanese advance against Kunming, into Thailand except as previously indicated, or an attack on Russia, would not justify intervention by the United States against Japan.

(e) All possible aid short of actual war against Japan should be extended to the Chinese Central Government.

(f) In case it is decided to undertake war against Japan, complete coordinated action in the diplomatic, economic, and military fields, should be undertaken in common by the United States, the British Commonwealth, and the Netherlands East Indies.

The Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff recommend that the United States policy in the Far East be based on the above conclusions.

Specifically, they recommend:

That the dispatch of United States armed forces for intervention against Japan in China be disapproved.

That material aid to China be accelerated consonant with the needs of Russia, Great Britain, and our own forces.

That aid to the American Volunteer Group be continued and accelerated to the maximum practicable extent.

That no ultimatum be delivered to Japan.

Chief of Staff.

Chief of Naval Operations.

THE JOINT BOARD

WASHINGTON

Secret

MINUTES OF MEETING, NOVEMBER 3, 1941

At the call of the Senior Member, the weekly meeting scheduled for November 5, 1941, was held today in Room 2003, Munitions Building. The meeting was called to order at 3:40 p. m.

Present: Admiral H. R. Stark, U. S. N., Chief of Naval Operations, Presiding; General G. C. Marshall, U. S. A., Chief of Staff; Rear Admiral R. E. Ingersoll, U. S. N., Assistant Chief of Naval Operations; Major General William Bryden, U. S. A., Deputy Chief of Staff; Major General H. H. Arnold, U. S. A., Deputy Chief of Staff for Air; Rear Admiral J. H. Towers, U. S. N., Chief of the Bureau of Aeronautics; Brigadier General L. T. Gerow, U. S. A., Acting Assistant Chief of Staff, War Plans Division; Captain O. M. Read, U. S. N., War Plans Division, Office of Naval Operations, in absence of Rear Admiral R. K. Turner; and Colonel W. P. Scobey, U. S. A., Secretary.

Additional Officers Present: Major General R. C. Moore, U. S. A., Deputy Chief of Staff; Colonel C. W. Bundy, U. S. A., War Plans Division, War Department General Staff; Captain R. E. Schuirmann, U. S. N., Office of Naval Operations; Commander F. P. Sherman, U. S. N., Office of Naval Operations; and Lieutenant Commander A. H. McCollum, U. S. N., Office of Naval Intelligence.

The Presiding Officer directed the minutes of the meeting of October 22, would stand approved unless there were objections. The minutes were approved.

The Secretary then announced the agenda for the meeting as follows:

Serial 693—Delivery of Aircraft to Great Britain.

Serial 732—Revision of Paragraph 109, "Joint Action of the Army and the Navy." Communications between Ship and Shore.

Serial 665-11—Allocation of Mechanical Time Fuze M43A2 to the Army and the Navy.

Serial 725—Coordination of Local Defense Measures in Bermuda and the West Indian Islands where United States Bases are being Established.—Revision requested by the British.

Discussion—Action of the United States in the Far East in support of China.

Discussion—Alternate Route via Canton Island for movement of airplanes to the Far East.

Action taken on the several subjects was as follows:

Serial 693—Delivery of Aircraft to Great Britain. Following a discussion of this subject, during which General Arnold stated that the development of airplane ferrying facilities to the British Isles was provided for in Serials 683-1 and 723, the Board approved the Joint Planning Committee report of October 23, 1941, and directed that the subject be stricken from the calendar.

Serial 732—Revision of Paragraph 109, "Joint Action of the Army and the Navy. The Joint Planning Committee report was approved.

Serial 665-11—Allocation of Mechanical Time Fuze M43A2 to the Army and the Navy. The Joint Planning Committee report recommendation of October 30, 1941, was accepted and the Committee of Experts' report was approved.

Serial 725—Coordination of Local Defense Measures in Bermuda and the West Indian Islands where United States Bases are being established. The Secretary announced that the Joint Planning Committee report before the Board, recommended certain revisions in the United States—United Kingdom initial agreement, which was approved by The Joint Board on September 19, 1941; and that the revisions now requested by the British had been accepted by the United States representatives. Following a properly seconded motion, the Board voted to approve the Joint Planning Committee report of October 29, 1941.

Action of the United States in the Far East in Support of China—At the request of Admiral Stark, Captain Schuirmann gave a statement of the action taken at the State Department meeting on Saturday morning, November 1, at which a discussion was held on the Far Eastern situation. Captain Schuirmann states that the meeting was occasioned by messages from Chiang Kai-Shek and General Magruder, urging the United States to warn Japan against making an attack on China through Yunnan and suggesting that the United States urge Great Britain to support more fully opposition to Japan. He pointed out that on August 17, following the President's return from the meeting at sea with Mr. Churchill, the President had issued an ultimatum to Japan that it would be necessary for the United States to take action in case of further Japanese aggression. He further stated that Mr. Hull was of the opinion that there was no use to issue any additional warnings to Japan if we can't back them up, and he desired to know if the military authorities would be prepared to support further warnings by the State Department. A second meeting was held at the State Department on Sunday, November 2, at which time it was proposed that the British should send some planes to Thailand and that Japan should be warned against movement into Siberia.

Following Captain Schuirmann's presentation, Admiral Stark read a Navy Department estimate of the recent dispatches received from Chungking. Admiral Ingersoll, gave his personal review of the situation. A summary of this review was that:

a. The decision on the Far Eastern situation, made several months ago, is to make the major effort in the Atlantic, and if forced to fight in the Pacific, to engage in a limited offensive effort. This policy was stated in the U.S.-British Staff Conversations Report ABC-1.

b. A major war effort in the Pacific would require an enormous amount of shipping, which would have to come from the Atlantic and other essential areas.

c. A U. S. war in the Pacific would materially affect United States aid to England.

d. The requirements in tankers alone for support of a Pacific war would create a serious oil shortage in this country, and the United States fleet cannot be supported in the Pacific without auxiliary shipping and adequate supplies.

e. The shortest line of communication is flanked by Mandated Islands, and is vulnerable to Japanese attack. Two other routes are available for communications to the Far Eastern Theater: one via Australia; the other via Cape of Good Hope.

f. Assuming that the fleet could be moved to the Far East, no repair facilities are available at either Manila or Singapore; while there are docks, nevertheless the necessary machinery and facilities for making repairs are not present.

g. Manila is not as yet a secure base for the Fleet due to the lack of adequate antiaircraft protection for the anchorage.

This review pointed out that Japan is capable of launching an attack in five directions; viz., against Russia, the Philippines, into Yunnan, Thailand and against Malaya. Considering that Japan might initiate one or more of these five operations, United States' action should be: In case of Japanese attack against either the Philippines or British and Dutch positions the United States should resist the attack. In case of Japanese attack against Siberia, Thailand or China through Yunnan the United States should not declare war. The study concludes that the United States should defer offensive action in the Far East until the augmentation of United States military strength in the Philippines, particularly as to the increase in submarines and army forces, becomes available.

Discussing the situation Admiral Ingersoll pointed out that the fleet strength at the present time is seriously handicapped by the absence of certain naval units of major category which are in the repair yards, and it was felt that the present moment was not the opportune time to get brash. Explaining further the State Department conferences, Captain Schuirmann stated that the State Department did not feel that it was necessary for the United States to take immediate action, even if stern warnings should be issued. In this connection, he read Mr. Hornbeck's statement. Admiral Ingersoll felt that the State Department was under the impression that Japan could be defeated in military action in a few weeks.

General Marshall felt that the main involvement in the Far East would be Naval and that under this assumption, due consideration should be given to the fact that the Navy was now fighting a battle in the Atlantic. It was his information that the Japanese authorities had not as yet determined the action to be taken under the present situation. The information which he had received indicated that the Japanese authorities might be expected to decide upon the national policy by November 5. He then read General Gerow's analysis of the strength of the United States forces in the Far East and emphasized the danger of moving Army Air Forces away from their present station in the Philippines. It was his belief that as long as the augmented Army Air Force remained in the Philippines, Japanese action against the Philippines or towards the south would be a very hazardous operation. It was his belief that by the middle of December, the Army Forces in the Philippines would be of impressive strength, and this in itself would have a deterrent effect on Japanese operations.

Admiral Ingersoll gave a summary of naval reinforcements scheduled for the Philippines. A stated number of submarine units en route to the Philippines were now in Guam. Other submarines scheduled for transfer to the Philippines were about to leave Hawaii. With reference to Japanese decision on National policy he felt that United States forces and shipping now being moved to the Philippines might be in danger if a decision adverse to United States interest should be made on November 5th. General Marshall emphasized the point that Japan could hardly take the risk of military operations with a powerful air and submarine force directly on the flank of their supply lines, and that when United States power is sufficiently developed in the Philippines, we would then have something to back up our statements. Until powerful United States forces had been built up in the Far East, it would take some very clever diplomacy to save the situation. It appeared that the basis of U. S. policy should be to make certain minor concessions which the Japanese could use in saving face. These concessions might be a relaxation on oil restrictions or on similar trade restrictions.

Following these discussions the Board adopted the following proposal submitted by Admiral Ingersoll and amended by suggestions made by Admiral Stark and General Marshall:

War Plans Division of the War and Navy Departments would prepare a memorandum for the President, as a reply to the State Department's proposed policy in the Far Eastern situation. The memorandum would take the following lines:

Oppose the issuance of an ultimatum to Japan.

Oppose U. S. military action against Japan should she move into Yunnan.

Oppose the movement and employment of U. S. military forces in support of Chiang Kai-Shek.

Advocate State Department action to put off hostilities with Japan as long as possible.

Suggest agreements with Japan to tide the situation over for the next several months.

Point out the effect and cost a U. S.-Japanese war in the Far East would have on defense aid to Great Britain and other nations being aided by the U. S.

Emphasize the existing limitations on shipping and the inability of the U. S. to engage in a Far Eastern offensive operation without the transfer of the major portion of shipping facilities from the Atlantic to the Pacific.

On the question of gas and oil for the Philippines' Army Air Forces, General Arnold explained that the military authorities were building up reserves and were investigating reports that the Dutch East Indies were capable of supplying all United States and British requirements.

At this point, General Marshall presented a list of items of equipment considered necessary by the China Mission to enable China to maintain her war effort. He pointed out that the War Department was beset with many trials and difficulties in the allocation of Lend-Lease items as related to Great Britain, Russia, Dutch East Indies, China and other countries. In the case of Russia, a large amount of equipment allocated to that country would have to go via Archangel, Vladivostok or Basra. The shortage of shipping, the long lines of communications, and the difficult transport situation from the ports of debarkation might cause an inability to make prompt delivery of all equipment to its final destination. Under some conditions, this would mean piling up unused equipment at various localities, while at the same time other localities would suffer from shortage of equipment. The matter resolves itself into a question as to whom Lend-Lease material should be released. It was General Marshall's opinion that control of Lend-Lease distribution, and diversions incident thereto, is a strategic decision which should be made by The Joint Board. Since the matter of ocean tonnage is a critical feature in the delivery of Lend-Lease items and is related to the strategic situation, General Marshall felt that Admiral Land of the Maritime Commission should be called in to sit with The Joint Board in deciding matters of this nature. The Board agreed that Admiral Land should be asked to detail a member of his department to work with the Joint Planning Committee on reports involving the disposition of Lend-Lease materials. Navy members agreed to take the necessary steps to inform Admiral Land of this request.

Referring to the merchant shipping situation, Admiral Stark felt that merchant tonnage is so short and prospective requirements are so great that an effort should be made to get the 1942 merchant vessel construction program moved up to an A-1-a priority.

At the direction of Admiral Stark, Commander Sherman then read a report from War Plans Division, Office of Naval Operations, to the Chief of Naval Operations concerning the movement of airplanes to the Middle East for ultimate delivery to Russia. This report recommended that the *Normandie* be acquired to meet future requirements for transporting aircraft; that three additional sea trains also be acquired and placed in service without conversion; and that delivery of aircraft to the Middle East be effected by the use of these three sea trains plus the two sea trains U. S. S. Kitty Hawk and U. S. S. Hammondsport, already acquired and converted for Navy use. Copy of this report was furnished to the Deputy Chief of Staff for Air.

Alternate route via Canton Island for movement of airplanes.—Following a discussion of this subject the Board instructed that the following directive be given to the Joint Planning Committee:

It is directed that the Joint Planning Committee submit a report as to the action to be taken to complete the establishment of an additional landplane route between Hawaii and Australia, less vulnerable to hostile interference than is the existing route via Wake Island, and as to the defenses of additional airdromes and landing fields acquired.

W. P. SCOBEE,
Colonel, G. S. C.,
Secretary.

NOVEMBER 3, 1941.

Memorandum for the Chief of Staff:

Subject: Far Eastern Situation.

I. Discussion.

1. A conference was held at the State Department during the morning of November 1, 1941. Present were Secretary Hull, Under Secretary Welles, Mr. Hornbeck, other lesser State Department officials and Captain Schuirmann, U. S. N. The subject of discussion was the action which should be taken on the Magruder radiogram of October 28, 1941. Question arose as to the strength of U. S. forces in the Far East as affecting diplomatic pressure on Japan. Measures were discussed, such as sending U. S. Army Air Forces to China, which might lead to immediate involvement in war with Japan. Apparently, the statement of Chiang Kai-Shek, that an immediate Japanese attack on Kunming threatened and that this could be defeated only by the intervention of air forces, was accepted.

2. a. The War Department G-2 estimate (Tab A) does not support Chiang Kai-Shek's conclusions as to immediate initiation of a Japanese move toward Kunming. G-2 believes that: the movement if contemplated will not be initiated in less than two months; the movement will be very difficult over nearly 300 miles of roadless, broken country; the Chinese, in favorable defense terrain, can defeat this offensive by proper concentration and use of ground troops alone.

b. G-2 (Col. Bratton) agrees with the Magruder statement that with the fall of Kunming, Chinese resistance to Japan would be very seriously affected.

c. The G-2 estimate also covers the broader viewpoint of expected Japanese action.

3. An air estimate of the Far Eastern situation (Tab B) brings out the following: the most effective air aid to China can be given by units based in the Philippines; there are at present, many shortages in ammunition and gasoline supply which will militate against a sustained effort; logical difficulties, aside from general policy, make it undesirable to undertake operations of United States Army Air Force units in China.

4. The status of the Lend-Lease program for China is shown in Tab C.

5. The status of ground troops and defense reserves in the Philippine Department is shown in Tab D. The garrison has not reached the effective strength desired by General MacArthur. Deficiencies are being overcome by the dispatch of personnel and supplies from the United States and by accelerating the training and equipping of the Philippine Army. The present combined air and ground forces will make attack on the islands a hazardous undertaking. The dispatch of any considerable portion of the air garrison to China would leave Luzon open to serious risk of capture.

6. Informal contact with officers of the local British Staff Mission indicate that the British have incomplete air forces for the defense of Singapore, would refuse to allow units of the Royal Air Force to support Chinese troops in Yunnan, and are of the firm opinion that the British Chiefs of Staff would strongly disapprove any action in China which might bring on war with Japan.

7. War Plans Division is strongly of the opinion that:

a. The policies derived in the American-British Staff conversations remain sound, viz:

(1) The primary objective is the defeat of Germany.

(2) The principal objective in the Far East is to keep Japan out of the war.

(3) Military counter-action against Japan should be considered only in case of any of the following actions by Japan:

(a) A direct act of war by Japanese armed forces against the Territory or Mandated Territory of any of the Associated Powers. It is not possible to define accurately what would constitute "a direct act of war." It is possible for a minor incident to occur which, although technically an act of war, could be resolved by diplomatic action. It is recognized that the decision as to whether such an incident is an act of war must lie with the Government concerned.

(b) The movement of the Japanese forces into any part of Thailand to the west of 100° East or to the south of 10° North.

(c) The movement of a large number of Japanese warships, or of a convoy of merchant ships escorted by Japanese warships, which from its position and course was clearly directed upon the Philippine Islands, the East coast of the Isthmus of Kra or the East coast of Malaya, or had crossed the parallel of 6° North between Malaya and the Philippines, a line from the Gulf of Davao to Waigeo Island, or the Equator east of Waigeo.

(d) The movement of Japanese forces into Portuguese Timor.

(e) The movement of Japanese forces into New Caledonia or the Loyalty Islands.

b. Germany must be defeated. If Japan be defeated and Germany remain undefeated, decision is not reached. The means to defeat Japan (Army, Navy, and tonnage), must be withdrawn in quantity from the effort against Germany. To defeat Germany will require the utmost total effort.

c. It is desirable that large Japanese forces be kept involved in China. However, from the larger viewpoint, prospective Chinese defeat would not warrant involvement of the United States, at this time, in war with Japan.

d. Political and economic measures should be used wherever effective to deter Japanese action.

e. Most effective aid to China, as well as to the defense in Singapore and the Netherlands East Indies, is now being built up by the reinforcement of the Philippines. The safety of Luzon as an air and submarine base should soon be reasonably assured by the arrival of air and ground reinforcements. Strong diplomatic and economic pressure may be exerted from the military viewpoint at the earliest about the middle of December, 1941, when the Philippine Air Force will have become a positive threat to Japanese operations. It would be advantageous, if practicable, to delay severe diplomatic and economic pressure until February or March, 1942, when the Philippine Air Force will have reached its projected strength, and a safe air route, through Samoa, will be in operation.

f. Material aid to China should be accelerated consonant with the studied needs of Russia and Great Britain.

g. Aid to the Volunteer Air Force in China should be continued and accelerated as far as practicable.

II. Recommendations.

Substitution of the words "War Department" for "War Plans Division" in paragraph 7 above and approval of that paragraph as a statement of the War Department's position on the Far East situation at this time.

L. T. GEROW,
Brigadier General,
Acting Assistant Chief of Staff.

6 Incls.*

#1—Tab A—G-2 Estimate

#2—Tab B—Air Estimate

#3—Tab C—Lend-Lease Program for China.

#4—Tab D—Ground Troops & Def. Res. Phil. Dept.

#5—Tab E—Ground Reinforcement, Phil. Dept.

#6—Tab F—Rad, fr. Gen. Magruder (10-28-41)

*Tab A is included in Exhibit No. 33; other tabs not included.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

DIVISION OF FAR EASTERN AFFAIRS

[Faint, illegible handwritten text, possibly a signature or address, is visible in the center of the page.]

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

February 12, 1944

Dear Mr. [Name]:

I have your letter of [Date] regarding [Subject].

The [Department] is currently [Action].

I will give this to [Name] for [Action].

[Handwritten signature]

[Handwritten initials]

[Handwritten name]

ADDRESS OFFICIAL COMMUNICATIONS TO
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON, D. C.



DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

STRICTLY
CONFIDENTIAL

13
November 10, 1941.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

There is attached for your consideration a draft of a message from you to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek in reply to his message to you of November 2 which was delivered on November 4 by the Chinese Ambassador. If this reply meets with your approval, it is suggested that you ask the Chinese Ambassador here to call and that you deliver the reply to the Ambassador with the request that he transmit it to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.

Enclosure:
Draft
message.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

There is attached for your information a copy of a document submitted to the Board of Directors of the United States Steel Corporation on the 17th of January, 1912, and the report of the Board of Directors thereon. It is suggested that you see the Director of the Bureau of Investigation and the Attorney General in connection with the subject of the document and its contents.

Very truly yours,
J. Edgar Hoover

JAN 22 1912

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STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

To Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek from President Roosevelt:

I have for some days had before me your message of November 2 which was delivered to me through your Ambassador here on November 4; also, your earlier message which was delivered to me through Dr. T. V. Soong on October 30.

We have had for some time very much in mind the situation created by the menace of a Japanese attack against Kuning from Indochina to which you call special attention. When I received the first of your messages under reference, officers of this Government, including high officers of the Department of State, the Army and the Navy, entered immediately into consultations in order to give renewed and urgent consideration to all aspects of the problems underlying that situation. It soon became our conclusion that, while it would be a grave error to underestimate the gravity of that situation, it did not appear that preparations by Japan for a land campaign against Kuning had advanced to a point which would indicate probable immediate imminence of an attack. Given the difficult character of the terrain

and

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and the formidable resistance which your land forces would offer in Yunnan, an invasion of that province from Indochina by land forces calls for substantial preparation and extensive operations. At the same time we fully realize that it is important that your forces be adequately prepared, equipped and disposed in all branches. Under existing circumstances, taking into consideration the world situation in its political, military and economic aspects, we feel that the most effective contribution which we can make at this moment is along the line of speeding up the flow to China of our Lend-Lease materials and facilitating the building up of the American volunteer air force, both in personnel and in equipment. We are subjected at present, as you know, to demands from many quarters and in many connections. We are sending materials not only to China and Great Britain, but to the Dutch, the Soviet Union and some twenty other countries that are calling urgently for equipment for self-defense. In addition, our program for our own defense, especially the needs of our rapidly expanding Navy and Army, calls for equipment in large amount and with great promptness. Nevertheless, I shall do my utmost toward achieving expedition of increasing amounts of material for your use.

Meanwhile

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Meanwhile we are exchanging views with the British Government in regard to the entire situation and the tremendous problems which are presented, with a view to effective coordinating of efforts in the most practicable ways possible.

I believe that you will share my feeling that measures such as the foregoing, together with such as the British Government are considering, adopted and implemented simultaneously with your intensive efforts to strengthen the defenses of Hawaii Province are sound steps toward safeguarding against such threat of an attack upon Hawaii as may be forthcoming. Certainly intensifying the situation: our own military and naval defenses along the coast of Hawaii, which are being steadily increased, and our air force along the coast of Hawaii, which is being steadily increased, are our present and immediate defenses in the field situation. We are not dependent upon our own forces for the maintenance of their operations in the field.

The situation in the Pacific is being followed out to the Government of Japan and the Government of Hawaii in order to keep abreast of progress and developments.

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I assure you that the situation and the progress
which are the subject of this correspondence will con-
tinue to have my best and my country's best interests